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Abstract 
Because of the limited server and network capacities for streaming applications, 
multimedia proxies are commonly used to cache multimedia objects such that, 
by accessing nearby proxies, clients can enjoy smaller start-up latencies and re-
ceive a better quality-of-service (QoS) guarantee (e.g, reduced packet loss and 
delay jitters for their multimedia requests). However, the use of multimedia 
proxies increases the risk that multimedia data are exposed to unauthorized 
access by intruders. In this paper, we present a framework for implementing 
a secure multimedia proxy or, more generally, a secure proxy architecture for 
audio and video streaming applications. The framework employs a notion of 
asymmetric reversible parametric sequence to provide the following security 
properties: (i) data confidentiality during transmission, (ii) end-to-end data 
confidentiality, (iii) data confidentiality against proxy intruders, and (iv) data 
confidentiality against member collusion. Our framework is grounded on a 
multi-key RSA technique such that system resilience against attacks is prov-
ably strong given standard computability assumptions. We also propose the 
ii 
use of a set of encryption configuration parameters (ECP) to trade off proxy en-
cryption throughput against the presentation quality of audio/video obtained 
by unauthorized parties. Implementation results show that we can simulta-
neously achieve high encryption throughput and extremely low audio/video 
quality (in terms of audio fidelity, and peak signal to noise ratio and visual 
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Advancement in digital audio/video and compression technologies has led to 
the recent wide deployment of continuous media streaming over the Internet. 
A wide range of applications such as video-on-demand, distance learning, and 
corporate telecasts and narrowcasts are now enabled by the ability to stream 
audio/video data from servers to clients across a wide area network. However, 
because of the high bandwidth requirement (e.g., a high quality video stream-
ing application usually has a bandwidth requirement of over 1 Mb/s) and the 
long duration nature of digital video (e.g., from tens of minutes to several 
hours), server and network bandwidths are major limiting factors in achieving 
a scalable and high quality streaming service. Consequently, there has been 
a lot of research on developing techniques for bandwidth-efficient distribution 
of multimedia data to a large client population. One common solution, for 
example, is to use a multimedia proxy to perform some form of data caching 
(say, prefix caching), of popular audio/video objects, so that clients can access 
the cached data from their nearby proxies to reduce startup delay and conserve 
bandwidth. 
One major problem with the multimedia proxy approach is the risk of 
revealing the original multimedia data to unauthorized parties. For example, 
when the original multimedia data are sent from a server to a multimedia 
proxy, anyone that eavesdrops on the communication link between the source 
1 
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and the multimedia proxy can gain access to the audio/video information. 
Some common approaches to counter the problem are: 
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Figure 1.1: Encryption using a secret key between the server and the proxy. 
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Figure 1.2: End-to-end encryption using a secret key between the server, the 
proxy, and the clients. 
1. Encryption using a secret key between the server and the proxy: 
Figure 1.1 illustrates an approach of using a secret key between the server 
and the proxy for the encryption. Under this approach, the server and 
the proxy will exchange a secret key X for encrypting the audio/video 
data. The source encrypts the data based on the secret key X and 
sends the encrypted data to the proxy. The proxy, upon receiving the 
encrypted data, can perform decryption and cache the audio/video data 
in clear form. There are several problems with this approach, including: 
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Figure 1.3: Heterogeneous secret keys between the server-proxy pair and the 
proxy-client pairs. 
• Data insecurity at the proxy: Since the cached data at the proxy 
are the original multimedia data, any intruder who gains access to 
the proxy's storage can access the original data. Note that this is a 
major security issue since multimedia data are large in size, implying 
the necessity to use multiple disks. Intruders who gain access to any 
of the storage devices may be able to obtain the original multimedia 
content. 
• Data insecurity between the proxy and clients: Since data transfer 
between the proxy and its clients can be over an insecure channel, 
one can eavesdrop on this channel and gain access to the original 
multimedia data. 
2. End-to-end encryption using a secret key between the server， 
the proxy, and the clients: Figure 1.2 illustrates an approach of ap-
plying end-to-end encryption using a secret key between the server, the 
proxy, and the clients. Under this approach, the server, the proxy, and 
all the clients behind the multimedia proxy will share a common secret 
key X . The source encrypts the multimedia data based on X and sends 
the data to the multimedia proxy. The proxy, upon receiving the en-
crypted data, caches the encrypted data in its local storage. Whenever 
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a client wants to access the multimedia data, the encrypted copy will be 
sent to that client. Since all clients behind the multimedia proxy know 
the common secret key, clients can decrypt and extract the original mul-
timedia data. An intruder can still eavesdrop on the communication link 
between the proxy and the client, but it will not be able to decrypt the 
data. The major problem with this approach is that there is a high risk of 
revealing the secret key A'. The reason is that a proxy needs to support 
a large number of clients, and if any of these clients is compromised, an 
intruder can use the revealed secret key X to gain access to the original 
multimedia data. 
3. Heterogeneous secret keys between the server-proxy pair and 
the proxy-client pairs: Figure 1.3 illustrates an approach of using 
heterogeneous secret keys between the server-proxy pair and the proxy-
client pairs. Under this approach, the server encrypts the multimedia 
data based on a common secret key X that is shared between the server 
and the proxy only. Upon receiving the data, the proxy caches the en-
crypted data in its local storage. Whenever a client, say i, wants to 
access the multimedia data, the proxy will (1) decrypt the data based 
on the secret key A", (2) encrypt the data based on a common secret key 
A't, which is shared between the multimedia proxy and the client i. The 
client i, upon receiving the encrypted data, can gain access to the original 
data because it knows the common secret key A'j. The potential problem 
with this approach is that it requires high computational overhead at the 
multimedia proxy, because the proxy needs to perform decryption and 
encryption for every admitted client. This can be a major scalability 
problem which limits the number of concurrent clients that the proxy 
can support, and if the proxy is compromised, an intruder can obtain 
the secret key JM. 
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In this paper, we present a proxy encryption framework having the following 
security properties: 
• The multimedia proxy will only cache the encrypted multimedia data 
and data decryption will only happen at the endpoints (e.g, the clients). 
Therefore, the original multimedia data will not be revealed at any in-
termediate node. 
• The multimedia proxy will perform encryption operations only (i.e., the 
proxy will not perform any decryption); this reduces the computational 
overhead at the multimedia proxy, and hence allows one to build a more 
scalable proxy to support a higher number of concurrent clients. Also, 
even when a multimedia proxy is compromised, an intruder cannot obtain 
any useful information. 
• Data encryption and decryption operations are based on well accepted 
encryption theory that it is computationally infeasible to extract the 
original multimedia data without knowledge of the expected decryption 
key. 
• Membership collusion can be avoided, such that given (1) the decryption 
key of client i, (2) the encrypted data of client j, and (3) possibly all the 
encryption keys, the intruder still cannot derive the original multimedia 
data. 
• The proposed approach can be extended to a multi-level proxy frame-
work; for example, a peer-to-peer architecture. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present 
multi-key encryption based on the asymmetric reversible parametric sequence. 
We then present a practical algorithm to implement an asymmetric reversible 
parametric sequence to achieve the claimed security properties for a multi-
media proxy server. In Chapter 3, we present our proxy system architecture 
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and the proxy-server and client-proxy communication protocols. In Chapter 
4, we illustrate how multi-key encryption can be extended to a multi-layer 
proxy architecture. Chapter 5 presents the Secure Multimedia Library (SML), 
a software library for developing secure multimedia applications in our archi-
tecture. In Chapter 6, we report implementation results that illustrate the 
achievable encryption data rate using our technique on a commodity Pentium 
machine, and give quantitative and qualitative analysis of the encrypted au-
dio/video quality. Related work on multimedia proxies is presented in Chapter 
7. Chapter 8 concludes. 
Chapter 2 
Multi-Key Encryption Theory 
In this chapter, we state the theory behind the design of a multi-key secure 
video proxy. The main theory is based on the reversible parametric sequence 
(HPS) [5]. We first present the formal definition of RPS and its utilities. We 
then present an implementation of RPS using the multi-key RSA technique. 
2.1 Reversible Parametric Sequence 
Let f : I N � I N he di function which has the following property: if F = 
f[X, e), it is computationally infeasible to find e given that we know X and Y. 
Assume that we have a finite sequence {e。，ei, • • • , cn} of TV + 1 elements, 
where the elements are not necessarily unique. Define a finite data transfor-
mation sequence V = {I )_i , D o , D m } based on the function f and the finite 
sequence {ei}o<KN such that 
D - i = original data 
Di = / ( A - i , e i ) for 0 < i < N . 
We have the following definitions of a reversible parametric sequence (RPS). 
Definition 1 is a reversible parametric sequence of the function / , denoted 
7 
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as RPSj, if for all {X,Y) G IN^ and -I < i < j < N, there exists a com-
putable function Qij such that 
Di = nij(Dj) for - l < i < j < N . 
Definition 2 A RPS/ is called a symmetric reversible parametric sequence of 
f , denoted as SRPSj , if the function Hj-j can be computed from the knowledge 
of the sub-sequence {e i+i , . . . , ej}. 
Definition 3 A RPS/ is called an asymmetric reversible parametric sequence 
of / , denoted as ARPSj, if it is computationally infeasible to determine the 
function flij based on the knowledge of the sub-sequence {e i+i , . . . , ej}. 
D_1 Do Di ^ ^ D2 ^ ^ Dn 
Figure 2.1: A graphical representation of two RPSf sequences. 
To understand the concepts, we use a graph to represent a reversible para-
metric sequence RPSJ. Figure 2.1 illustrates two RPSF sequences. In the 
figure, the original data are transformed to Do using Dq = f{D, cq). If 
ei + e*, then the intermediate data Di will not be equal to D*, for 1 < i < A^ . 
For a symmetric reversible parametric sequence SRPSj, one can compute the 
original data D_i if given the data Dj (or D” and the sequence { e � , •. • , ej} 
(or {eg, • • • for 0 < j < A^ . In other words, given the information 
{ e o , … , e j } and Dj, one can construct a decryption function n _ i j so as to 
obtain the original data For an asymmetric reversible parametric se-
quence ARPSj, one cannot derive the original data Z)_i even if given the data 
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Video Proxy 
产 » ( CLIENT 1 ) 
- ( g ) - ( CL::ENT 2 ) 
^ e^  
Source （ CLIENT ^ 
Figure 2.2: A graphical representation of an ARPSj sequence for the secure 
multimedia proxy considering one proxy layer. 
Dj (or D'j) and the knowledge of the sequence {eo , . . . , ej} (or { e j , …， e � } ) , 
for 0 < i < A^ . 
One can use the properties of an asymmetric reversible parametric sequence 
ARPSf to implement a secure multimedia proxy. To illustrate, consider a 
graphical representation of an ARPSj sequence in Figure 2.2. The multimedia 
proxy can request Dq, the encrypted version of the original data from the 
source. Based on an encrypted key eo, the source will transmit the encrypted 
data DO to the proxy, and the encrypted data Dq will be cached at the proxy's 
local storage. When a client i requests the data, the proxy will further encrypt 
the encrypted data Dq using the encryption key and send the resulting 
encrypted data Di to client i. Client i, upon receiving Di, can decrypt the data 
to obtain the original data D一i, if client i is given a decryption function n_i’i 
(this is a property of reversible parametric sequences). In addition, when the 
encryption is carried out using an asymmetric reversible parametric sequence, 
then even when an entity holds on to all the encryption keys ei for 0 < i < it 
still cannot decrypt any of the encrypted data Di being cached, for 0 < i < A^ , 
in order to obtain the original data D一i. 
In general, one can use an asymmetric reversible parametric sequence ARPSj 
to implement a secure multimedia proxy which has the following properties: 
• Data confidentiality during transmission: Since the original data 
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D - i are encrypted, an intruder who eavesdrops on the communication 
link between the source and the multimedia proxy can only access Dq 
and will not be able to extract the original data. The same property 
holds when an intruder eavesdrops on the link between the multimedia 
proxy and a client i. The intruder can only access Di and will not be 
able to extract the original data. 
• End-to-end data confidentiality: By the property of the RPSF, de-
cryption of the original data only takes place at the endpoints (e.g., 
the receiving clients). The multimedia proxy and clients only store the 
data encrypted as Dq and DI. Hence, even if an intruder gains access 
to the proxy's or client's local storage, the original data D - i will not be 
revealed. 
• Data confidentiality against proxy intruders: If an intruder com-
promises the proxy server or a client's machine, and if the encryption 
process is an SRPSj, then the intruder, on knowing Cq and Cj, can gain 
access to D一i. This is because the function n_i’o can be computed from 
the knowledge of cq and/or €{ such that the original data can be revealed 
by = n_i ’o(A)). One example of this situation is when the en-
cryption is carried out using a common secret key eo between the proxy 
and the source. In this case, access to eo and Dq can reveal the original 
data D一I. On the other hand, if the encryption process is an ARPSj, 
then even if eo and e^  are compromised, the original data D - i cannot 
be revealed, because the decryption function n_i’o is computationally 
infeasible to determine in this case. 
• Data confidentiality against member collusion: If the encryption 
process is SRPSj, member collusion is possible when a client j gains 
access to 
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1. Ci and ej (where > 0), 
2. the encrypted data Di, and 
3. the decrypting function 
In this case, client j (i.e., the intruder) can access the original data 
For example, 
1. Given e,-, the intruder can obtain Qo^ i and thus obtain Do = Qo,i(Di). 
2. Given the knowledge of ej and Dq, the intruder can obtain Dj by 
Dj = f{Do,ej), 
3. Since the intruder knows the decryption function floj , the original 
data are revealed by 
D-i = ^-lADj). 
However, if the encryption process is an ARPSf, the intruder cannot 
reveal the original data D_i because the function Qo’i is computationally 
infeasible to determine. 
2.2 Implementation of ARPSf 
In the previous section, we present the desirable properties of an ARPS func-
tion. However, we still need a practical and efficient algorithm to realize a 
secure multimedia proxy server. In our work, we use a multi-key RSA ap-
proach to implement an ARPSf. We first present a basic overview of RSA. 
We then extend the concept to a multi-key RSA framework. 
For standard RSA (or single-key RSA), one needs to generate two distinct 
large prime numbers p and q. Let us define 
n = p . q, and (j) 二 (j) — V) . [q — 1). 
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To encrypt a given data item one has to find an encryption key cq such 
that the integer eo satisfies 
1 < eo < <f), and gcd(eo’0) = 1. 
To encrypt the data D_i, we generate a cipher C based on the encryption key 
eo wherein 
C = p_i”Omod n. 
The cipher C can be transmitted over an insecure channel. The receiver needs 
to have a decryption key do to decrypt the cipher. This decryption key do is 
an integer and is selected based on the following criteria: 
1 < do < 小,and (e。）. do = l(mod cj)). 
Upon receiving the cipher, the receiver can decrypt the cipher C and obtain 
the original data D- i by 
= (C严mod n. 
Let us present the extension of the single-key RSA technique to a multi-
key RSA technique. Consider the source as an example. The source needs 
to generate two large prime numbers, say p and q. In addition, it needs to 
generate a sequence of encryption keys {ei}o<i<N such that 
I < ei <(/) and (2.1) 
gcd(e“ cj)) = 1 for 0 < z < A^ . (2.2) 
Moreover, one needs to generate a corresponding sequence of decryption keys 
di. The decryption key di has to satisfy the following two criteria: 
1 < di < 小 and (2.3) 
(eo • ti) 'di = l (mod 0). (2.4) 
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Efficient computation of these decryption keys di can be easily achieved using 
the Extended Euclidean Algorithm [7]. The source will send n and the en-
cryption keys ei over a secure channel to the multimedia proxy, while it will 
encrypt the original data D_i using eo and generate a cipher Dq using 
Do = ( D _ i ” m o d n . (2.5) 
The encrypted data Dq can be sent over an insecure channel. Upon receiving 
the cipher Do, the proxy can store the encrypted data in its local storage. 
Whenever a client i wants to access the data from the proxy, the proxy can 
retrieve the encrypted data Dq from its local storage, and encrypt Dq using 
the encryption key e^  by 
Di = (DoY'mod n. (2.6) 
The source (or the proxy) can send the decryption key di and n to client i 
over a secure channel. The encrypted data Di, on the other hand, can be sent 
over an insecure channel. Client i, upon receiving the encrypted data Di, can 
decrypt the data using di by: 
D - i = = (AO'^'mod n. (2.7) 
Example: To illustrate, consider the following simple example. Suppose that 
the two primes are p = 5 and q = 7 {in reality, p and q will have to be large). 
Accordingly, n = 5 x 7 = 35 and (/> = (5 - 1) x (7 - 1) = 24. Let there be three 
encryption keys: cq = 5, ei = 11 and e^  = 13. If the original data = 10, 
the cached data at the multimedia proxy will be 
Do = (lO^)mod 35 = 5, 
When client 1 requests the data, the source will generate a decryption key di 
such that (5 x ll)di = 1 mod 24. Using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, 
we have di = 7. Therefore, the encrypted data for client 1 is 
Di = {DoY'mod n = (5^^)mod 35 = 10 
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and client 1 can decrypt the data Di and get back the original data D- i by 
D- i = 广mod n = (lO^)mod 35 = 10. 
When client 2 requests the data, the source will generate a decryption key d] 
such that (5 x 13)d2 = 1 mod 24. Using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, 
we have d) = 17. Therefore, the encrypted data for client 1 is 
D2 = {DoY^mod n = mod 35 = 5 
and client 2 can decrypt the data D2 and get back the original data D_i by 
Z)一 1 = (£>2)如 mod n = (517) mod 35 = 10. 
Theorem 4 The above proxy encryption framework is a reversible parametric 
sequence. 
Proof: To show that the above framework is a reversible parametric sequence, 
we need to show that given DI, for z > 1, we can extract Dq and D^i. Without 
loss of generality, let us consider Di as the given input. The generation of Di 
is via 
Di = {DoY'inod n. = [(Z)_i)'°mod nf' mod n. 
= ( D _ i ) e o � o d 7 1 . 
Let the extracted result be R and equal to 
R = (Di产mod n = [(D_i”.eimod nf i mod n 
= ( D 一 
Since the encryption key eo and the decryption key di are generated such that 
Co • ei • di = fc . (p — 1) . (g — 1) + 1 where k is an integer, we can rewrite the 
extracted result R as 
R = [(LLi)(Z)_i”(P-i)(g-i)] mod n. 
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Based on Euler's theorem [7] that = 1 mod n, we have the following 
expressions: 
R = (D_i)(D_i)补= (LLi)lWg-i) = D_imod p, 
Because p and q are primes, based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem [7], we 
have 
R = 广 = L>_i(mod n) = 
Therefore, given Di, one can extract D_i given the knowledge of d]_. We can 
apply a similar procedure so that given Do, one can extract Di with another 
corresponding decryption key. In summary, given DI, one can extract Dq and 
the original data if the corresponding decryption key is known. I 
Theorem 5 The above proxy encryption procedure is an asymmetric reversible 
parametric sequence. 
Proof: To show that the above framework is an asymmetric reversible para-
metric sequence, all we need to show is that given the encrypted data Di, for 
« > 0, it is impossible to obtain the original data D_i, even if one has the 
knowledge of {eo, ei, cn} and n. 
Since we use an RSA encryption method, finding the decryption keys in 
Equations (2.3)-(2.4) amounts to finding the two prime factors p and q, which 
is well accepted to be computationally infeasible if p and q are large and prop-
erly chosen. Therefore, it is computationally infeasible to find ^lij. I 
Chapter 3 
Multimedia Proxy: 
Architectures and Protocols 
In this chapter, we describe in detail our server-proxy-client architecture. The 
multimedia server the multimedia proxy V and various clients have been 
implemented in the C language on a Linux platform. Security features such 
as key generation, encryption and decryption are implemented using the GNU 
Multiply Precision (GMP 4.0) library, which provides arbitrary precision arith-
metic on integers, rational numbers, and floating-point numbers. Note that 
GMP 4.0 provides one of the fastest possible arithmetic libraries for applica-
tions that need higher precision than what is directly supported by the basic 
C types. 
3.1 Operations to Request and Cache Data 
from the Server 
Let us first consider the case wherein the multimedia data are not yet cached 
at the proxy. Figure 3.1a illustrates the operations between the multimedia 
server S and the proxy V, and the operations between the proxy V and the 
client i for requesting and caching the multimedia data. These operations are: 
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1. Initiate connection: The client i sends a multimedia request and its 
certificate to certify its identity to the proxy V, and the proxy V forwards 
the request to the multimedia server S. (Client z's certificate is eCerti = 
(u“ where Ui and Vi are z's public and private keys, respectively, 
for RSA cryptography, and {D}K denotes information D encrypted with 
key k.) The multimedia server keeps a record of the public key for each of 
its authenticated clients. To vertify the identity of the requesting client, 
the multimedia server <S decrypts {wi}^^ using Ui as the decryption key. 
The request will only be granted if the decrypted message equals to Ui 
and match the public key of i in the server's authorized list. It relies 
on the fact that only genuine client i has the secret key Vi, so that 
only client i itself can generate this {“山‘）which when decrypts using 
Ui will produce the same Ui as the copy stored by the server. If the 
authentication is successful, then the server S will proceed to the key 
generation operation. 
2. Key generation: The server randomly generates two large prime num-
bers p and q, and computes the prime product n = p-q, the pseudo-prime 
product (j) = (n — 1) • (p— 1), the encryption key eo, re-encryption key e— 
and the corresponding decryption key di via Equations (2.1) and (2.2)* 
. T h e server S saves the parameters </>, eo and n with a unique identifier 
ID. It then replies back to the proxy V with the re-encryption key e^ , 
which is encrypted using the proxy's public key; and the correspond-
ing decryption key di, which is encrypted using the client z's public key. 
Note that the proxy V cannot extract the decryption key DI, but only 
the client i can perform the decryption to extract di. 
*In practice, the server S can pre-generate a set of encryption keys {e,} and decryption 
keys {di} per multimedia object per each of its authorized clients. 
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3. Decryption key retrieval: The proxy V replies with an acknowledg-
ment back to the client i with the encrypted di. The client i decrypts 
using its own private key to retrieve the decryption key di. 
4. Data encryption and streaming: The multimedia server S uses the 
encryption key Cq and n to encrypt the multimedia data packets. The 
degree of encryption is based on the encryption configuration parameters 
(ECP) which we will describe in Section 3.3. The multimedia server S 
then streams the encrypted data packets to the proxy V via an ordi-
nary and possibly insecure channel. Upon receiving the encrypted data 
packets, the proxy V caches the data without decryption or modification. 
5. Data re-encryption and streaming: The proxy V uses the re-encryption 
key ei and n to re-encrypt the already encrypted multimedia data pack-
ets in the cache. The encryption is based on the same ECP setting as 
what the server S used. The proxy V then streams the re-encrypted 
data packets to the client i via an ordinary and possibly insecure chan-
nel. Upon receiving the re-encrypted data packets, the client i can use 
the decryption key di to decrypt the received multimedia data packets. 
3.2 Operations to Request Cached Data from 
the Multimedia Proxy 
We consider the case wherein the multimedia data are already cached at the 
proxy. Figure 3.1b illustrates the operations between the multimedia server S 
and the proxy V, and the operations between the proxy V and the client j for 
requesting multimedia data that are already cached by the proxy V. These 
operations are: 
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1. Initiate connection: The client j sends a request to the proxy V with 
its certificate. The proxy V forwards the request to the server S with a 
specified unique identifier ID. The multimedia server S needs to authen-
ticate that the request is indeed from the client j. If the authentication 
succeeds, the server S will go on to the key generation operation. 
2. Key generation: The server S randomly generates a re-encryption 
key Cj and a corresponding decryption key dj based on the 小’ n and eo 
identified by ID. It then sends back to the proxy V the re-encryption key 
Cj, which is encrypted using the proxy's public key; and the decryption 
key dj, which is encrypted using the client j ' s public key. Again, the 
proxy V cannot extract the decryption key dj. 
3. Decryption key retrieval: The proxy V replies back to the client j 
with the encrypted decryption key. The client j decrypts using its own 
private key to retrieve the decryption key dj. 
4. Data re-encryption and streaming: The proxy V uses the re-encryption 
key ej and n to re-encrypt the cached multimedia data packets based on 
the previous ECP setting. It then streams the re-encrypted data packets 
to the client j via an ordinary and possibly insecure channel. Upon re-
ceiving the re-encrypted data packets, the client j can use the decryption 
key dj to decrypt the received multimedia data packets. 
3.3 Encryption Configuration Parameters (ECP) 
Differ from normal text documents, multimedia objects do not require entire 
encryption for proper protections. For example, a MPEG-1 stream consists of 
three types of frames, i.e. I-frames: Interpolative, P-frames: Predictive, and 
B-frames: Bipredictional. I-frames are inserted for every 12 to 15 frames, and 
operations such as playback, forward and review can only start at I-frames. 
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Thus, encryption on all the I-frames would provide enough protection but only 
require about 0.8% encrytpion operations compared to entire encryption. 
In a qualitative analysis, the degree of partial encryption affect the cliop-
piness of the playback of the encrypted video without a proper decryption 
key. In applications such as video-on-demand, online-lectures, etc., system 
throughput or system performance is most important and encryption security 
could be a trade-off. In this paper, we propose to use a general encryption 
method that can reduce the encryption overhead at the server and the proxy, 
decryption overhead at the end-clients, for a variety of commonly used video 
encoding formats (such as MPEG-1, MPEG-2, MP3 and Quicktime). We ex-
ploit the observation that, for video encoding that accounts for inter-frame 
data dependencies, a video stream only needs to be encrypted up to a certain 
percentage for decoding to be practically useless by an unauthorized viewer, 
in that either the video cannot be decoded, or the quality of the decoded video 
will be so poor that it is unacceptable for viewing. In general, ECP specifies a 
packet based encryption pattern given by four adjustable parameters, namely 
• Spkt, the expected number of bytes in a data packet. 
• Ei - the multimedia stream is to be partitioned into successive groups 
each having Ei consecutive packets, and a single packet encryption op-
eration is to be applied to the first packet of each group. 
• Ep ~ for the packet in which the packet encryption operation is to be 
applied, Ep specifies the fraction of data within the packet that should 
be encrypted. 
• Eb - for the packet in which the encryption operation is to be applied, 
Eb specifies the number of encryption blocks that should be evenly dis-
tributed within that encryption packet. 
In our current implementation, we use UDP as the transport protocol for 
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video data transmission. The entire multimedia stream will be divided into 
UDP packets with each packet having a pay load size of Spkt = 1400 bytes. For 
every Ei > 1 consecutive UDP packets, we will select the last UDP packet 
for encryption. For the encrypted packet, it will be further divided up into 
sub-blocks and only some of the sub-blocks will be encrypted. In our current 
implementation, the sub-block size is chosen to be 4 bytes less than the RSA 
key length (e.g., 60 bytes for 512-bit RSA) and the encryption will be based 
on this sub-block unit size. The total length of data to be encrypted within 
a packet is equal to Ep x Spkt rounded up to the nearest multiple of the sub-
block size. The encrypted sub-blocks will then be regrouped as E^ consecutive 
blocks of data, and the blocks will be distributed evenly across the whole 
packet. Once an ECP configuration is selected for a particular video object, 
the same configuration will be used by the server, the proxy and the end-client 
on their encryption or decryption operations. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates a possible set of encryption configuration parameters 
for a multimedia streaming application, where the packet size Spkt is equal to 
1400 bytes, Ei = 2 (i.e., out of every two consecutive packets, we select the 
last one for encryption), the fraction Ep is equal to 0.5, and Ei = A blocks are 
to be evenly distributed across an encrypted packet. The four configuration 
parameters allow us to achieve varying degrees of encryption and levels of 
audio/video quality for the decoded stream. In Chapter 6, we illustrate the 
computational and quality tradeoffs implied by these parameters. 
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P is the public key of the proxy and C is the public key of the client, 
and {D}k denotes information D encrypted with key k. 
Figure 3.1: Operations between the source video server S and the proxy V, ‘ 
and operations between the proxy V and the client z, for (a) non-cached video 
object and (b) cached video object. 
Chapter 3 Multimedia Proxy: Architectures and Protocols 23 
p a c k e t 0 p a c k e t 1 p a c k e t 2 p a c k e t 3 p a c k e t 4 
( 1 4 0 0 K B ) I ( 1 4 0 0 K B ) ^ 』 ( l A O O K B ) ‘ 』 ( 1 4 0 0 K B ) ^ 』 （ 1 4 0 0 K B ) ^  
§ ^ ^ ^ 冬 冬 、 矢 > 




Figure 3.2: Illustration of ECP with Spkt = 1400, Ei = 2, Ep = 0.5, and 
Eb = 4. 
Chapter 4 
Extension to multi-level proxy 
In this chapter, we describe how the multi-key secure proxy architecture can be 
extended to a multi-level proxy architecture. By multi-level proxy, we refer to a 
system in which a client can also play the role of a multimedia proxy and deliver 
encrypted multimedia data to other clients. Such multi-level proxies are very 
common. For example, we use multiple layers of web proxies in the Internet 
to serve information with a better quality of service (e.g., lower response time 
in getting a file resource). A multi-level proxy architecture can also be used in 
a peer-to-peer network such that clients within a peer group can quickly and 
securely share multimedia data among themselves. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates a multi-level proxy architecture. In the figure, a proxy 
is represented by a circle and we arrange the proxies into different layers. The 
source has an encryption generator, which is represented by a "square" near the 
source. For secure multimedia transmission, this encryption generator needs 
to: 
1. Generate two large prime numbers p and q. 
2. Compute n = p • q and 小=[p — 1) - [q — 1). 
3. Generate a set of encryption keys {ei}o<i<N such that 1 < Cj < </> and gcd(ei, </>)= 
1, where N is the number of proxies the encryption generator is willing 
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Figure 4.1: A graphical representation of a multi-level proxy architecture. 
to support. Note that by selecting two very large prime numbers p and 
q, we can potentially generate a very large set of encryption keys. 
4. Distribute each encryption key and n to each proxy on an on-demand 
basis. For example, the encryption generator will transmit the encryption 
key and n to the proxy i over a secure channel. 
Each proxy and the encryption generator will simply perform data input en-
cryption. For example, to perform encryption, proxy i simply needs to perform 
Di = (Di一‘ mod n. To illustrate, consider the top most layer in Figure 4.1: 
• The source will transmit Dq to proxies 1, 2, and 3 where Dq = (D—i”�mod n. 
• Proxy 1 will transmit Di to proxy 4, where Di = D^q mod n = mod n. 
• Proxy 4 will transmit D4 to proxy 5, where D4 = D^ ^ mod n = (Z)_i”oeie4 mod n. 
• This operation will repeat until the data reach the client at the end of 
the chain. 
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This implies that all cached data along all the proxies are made secure and are 
encrypted potentially using different keys. 
When a client of proxy k wishes to perform the data decryption, k needs 
to obtain the decryption key from the encryption generator and then deliver it 
to the client. Let {eij^>o} denote the set of encryption keys used by the proxies 
between the source and the proxy k. The decryption key <4 is selected such 
that 
(eii . e‘2 • • • eiiJ . 4 = 1 (mod (j)). 
For example, consider the client at the top layer in Figure 4.1. The encryption 
generator needs to generate de such that 
(eo • ei • 64 • 65 • ee) • o?6 = 1 (mod </>). 
This decryption key will be encrypted using a particular end-client's public key 
and transmitted to proxy 6, possibly through an insecure channel, and then 
the proxy 6 can transmit this decryption key to that designated client within 
its domain. 
Chapter 5 
Secure Multimedia Library 
(SML) 
We have implemented a prototype secure multimedia proxy system. The proto-
type is based on our Secure Multimedia Library (SML), which is a C language 
API that implements the secure proxy protocol described in Chapter 3. SML 
consists of a set of functions which can be used to develop a secure multimedia 
streaming system, both for the simple client-server architecture and the proxy-
assisted architecture. SML is an open source project* . In this chapter, we 
briefly introduce the programming interface of SML. We present two scenarios 
and use example codes to demonstrate how to use SML API in these scenarios. 
A complete listing of functions in the SML library is given at the appendix. 
5.1 Proxy Pre-fetches and Caches Data 
Prior to any client's request, the multimedia proxy may prefetch multimedia 
data from the source server during the proxy's idle time. Doing so can reduce 
the start-up latency experienced by the clients. The proxy first initializes an 
SML session, and then connects to the source in anonymous mode using: 
* Detailed documentation, source code, and demonstration programs can be 
downloaded at http: //www. cse. cuhk. edu. hk/~cslui/ANSRlab/sof tware. html and 
http: //www. cs. purdue. edu/homes/yau/sml. html. 
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SML.SESSION proxy; 
SML_InitSession(&proxy)； 
SML一Connect(&proxy， "source—addr"， source—port); 
Meanwhile, the source server is continually waiting for an incoming connec-
tion. An SML session between the source and the proxy is established when 
the source accepts the proxy connection request, as follows: 
SML.SESSION server, *session; 
SML_InitSession(&server)； 
session = SML一Accept(feserver, port_to_bind, "client_key_list"); 
The SML .Accept function will generate a set of encryption and decryption 
keys, and associate them with the newly established session. Also, the accept 
function may associate a default ECP setting with the SML session, or one 
can install an explicit set of ECP parameters using the following function call: 
SML一InitRps(session, Ei, Ep, Eb, Spkt, RPS_MULTI_KEY_RSA, key一length); 
Once an SML session is set up, the source sends the chosen ECP setting to 
the proxy (e.g., the proxy needs the ECP to determine the network packet 
size for serving the cached multimedia data) through the established network 
connection: 
SML_SendRps(session)； 
The ECP is received by the proxy through the function call: 
SML.ReceiveRps(&proxy)； 
With the knowledge of the ECP by both sides, the source server may 
start encrypting the original multimedia data contents, denoted by D, and 
transmitting the encrypted contents, denoted by D', to the proxy. The size of 
data in each transmitted packet can be less than or equal to the specified ECP 
packet size - the send function provided by SML will perform any necessary 
data padding: 
SML_TcpSendEncryptRps(session, data—packet, data.length)； 
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The proxy then caches in its local storage the encrypted multimedia data 
packets received from the source: 
SML_TcpReceiveRps(&proxy， data.packet, data_length)； 
5.2 Client Requests Cached Data From the 
Proxy 
In this scenario, suppose a certified client, say z, requests the previously cached 
data D' from the proxy. The client i first loads its certificate eCerti (see Section 
3.1) used to identify itself: 
SML.SESSION client; 
SML_InitSession(&client)； 
SML.LoadKeyPair(&client, "key_pair_file", "password", CRYPTO_KEY_RSA)； 
The client then connects to the proxy using the proxy's address and binding 
port: 
SML.Connect(&client, "proxy_addr", proxy—port); 
The proxy acts like the source server in accepting the connection request 
from the client. It then needs to use another SML session to forward the 
request to the actual server. That SML session must be established with the 
client's public key signature for proper authentication by the server: 
SML_Signature signature; 
SML_InitSignature(&signature)； 
session_to_client = SML_Accept(&proxy, proxy_biiiding_port， NULL)； 
SML_GetClientSignature(session_to_client, fcsignature)； 
SML_SetClientSignature(&session_to_server, signature)； 
SML_Connect(&session_to_server, "server_addr", server_port)； 
The proxy now holds two connections - one with the source server and the 
other with the client. Because the multimedia data D' are already cached by 
the proxy, the source does not need to perform any data encryption. Rather, 
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it needs to generate (i) a client-specific encryption key, ej, to be used by the 
proxy to encrypt D' (the resulting data are denoted as D") for sending to the 
client, and (ii) the corresponding decryption key, di, for the client to decrypt 
D" received from the proxy to get back the original data D. To prevent the 
proxy from obtaining di, the source encrypts di with z's public key to give d\. 
The source then sends both Cj and d'- to the proxy. In addition, it loads the 
ECP setting used for encryption and sends the ECP to the proxy: 
SML_LoadRpsSetting(&server, "rps_ecp.dat", "password")； 
SML.SendRpsSett ing(&server)； 







The proxy encrypts the cached D' with Ci and sends the resulting data D" to 
the client: 
SML_TcpSendReEncryptRps(&session_to_client, data_packet, data_size)； 
Finally, the client decrypts D" using di to retrieve the original multimedia 
data D: 
SML_ReceiveRpsSetting(&client)； 
SML_TcpReceiveDecryptRps(&client, data_packet, data_size)； 
Chapter 6 
Implementation Results 
In this chapter, we present our implementation results which quantify the 
encryption throughput, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of decoded audio for 
an audio streaming application, and the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and 
the visual quality of the decoded video for a video streaming application, in 
the context of our secure multimedia proxy architecture. 
In our implementation, we use the ECP in Section 3.3 to control the amount 
of encryption applied to blocks of audio/video data. The experimental results 
are taken on an 800 MHz Pentium-Ill Linux machine with 256 MBytes of main 
memory. For the video experiments (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), the input data 
are a set of video sequences, each being an 18 MByte MPEG-1 stream or a 
4.47 MByte Quicktime stream. 
Experiment 1 (Encryption Throughput Analysis): 
In this experiment, we consider the effect of the parameters Ep and Ei on the 
encryption throughput, which is denoted as p (in MBytes/s). Assume that we 
are encrypting an MPEG-1 video stream with an average bit rate of 1.5 Mb/s. 
Given the assumption, the average number of concurrent MPEG-1 streams 
that a proxy can support is M, where M = p/(1.5/8). Table 6.1 illustrates 
the encryption throughput p and the average number of concurrent MPEG-1 
streams (M) under different values of Ep and Ei, when Eb = 1. 
As we can observe from Table 6.1, if we encrypt 25.7% of each video 
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Table 6.1: Effect of Ep and Ei on the encryption throughput p (in unit of MBytes/s) 
and the average number of MPEG-1 streams M when EB = 1. 
packet (i.e., Ei = 1), the encryption throughput achieved is only around 
2.13 MBytes/s, which implies that we can only concurrently handle about 
11 MPEG-1 streams. On the other hand, if we encrypt one video packet for 
every 10 packets (i.e., Ei = 10) and for each video packet encrypted, we en-
crypt only 4.3% of its data (i.e., Ep = 0.043), then the encryption throughput 
improves to 11.82 MBytes/s, which implies that we can concurrently support 
about 63 MPEG-1 streams. In general, the smaller the value of Ep and the 
higher the value of Ei, the higher the achieved encryption throughput, and the 
higher the number of concurrent video streams that can be supported. 
Table 6.2 illustrates the effect of Ei and Eb under two different encryption 
percentage parameters Ep. As we can observe, the parameter Eb has little 
effect on the encryption throughput. 
Experiment 2 (Peak Signal-to-Noise Analysis): 
In this experiment, we consider the effect on the video quality as we vary 
the parameters Ei, Ep, and Eb. One way to quantitatively evaluate the video 
quality is by the peak signal-to-noise ratio. In general, for a frame size of m x n 
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Table 6.2: Effect of Ei and Eb on the encryption throughput p (in MBytes/s) for 
(a) Ep = 0.257 and (b) Ep = 0.171. 
with a total of I frames and 3 color channels (i.e., red, green, and blue, each 
represented by a 8-bit number), the peak signal-to-noise ratio (SNRpeak) is 
calculated using the following equation: 
SNRpeak = 10 X logio 7 ； — — ^ ^ 
(E二 1 E;;=I EUI \ 
、 3mnl ) 
where Pi[cc, y, z, c) means that the pixel value at coordinates (x^y) in the z-th 
frame for color channel c, where c = 1, c = 2, and c = 3 correspond to the 
color channels red, green, and blue, respectively. In our experiment, the values 
of m,n, and I are 640, 480, and 1000, respectively. Values of Pi are obtained 
from the video frames decoded by a client which does not have access to the 
decryption key, while values of P2 are obtained from the original video frames. 
Note that a lower value of SNRpeak indicates that the encrypted stream is 
more distorted from the original video stream. 
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Table 6.3: Effect of Bp and Ei on the peak signal-to-noise ratio SNRpeak on MPEG-
1 video when Eb = 1. 
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 illustrate the peak signal-to-noise ratio SNRpeak 
for different values of Ep and Ei with Eb = I for MPEG-1 and Quicktime 
video, respectively. Note that even when we encrypt one out of 10 video 
packets, and for a selected packet, we only encrypt 4.3% of the data, we can 
still obtain, a very low value of SNRpeak- This experiment indicates that (1) we 
can apply this encryption technique for different video formats (e.g., MPEGl 
or Quicktime) and, (2) we only need to encrypt a small fraction of the video 
data to achieve both high encryption throughput and high video distortion. 
Experiment 3 (Comparison of visual quality of encrypted video): 
In this experiment, we consider the effect of the ECP parameters E{, Ep and 
Eb on the visual quality of the video. Figure 6.1 illustrates the quality of five 
consecutive MPEG-1 video frames* . Figure 6.1(a) is the original video frames 
that a client can decode given access to the decryption key. Figures 6.1(b)-(e) 
are the corresponding five video frames when decoded without the decryption 
*The original and encrypted video/audio clips used in the experiments can be viewed or 
downloaded at http: //www. cse. cuhk. edu. hk/~cslui/ANSRlab/software/sml 
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Table 6.4: Effect of Ep and Ei on the peak signal-to-noise ratio SNRpeak on Quick-
time video when EF, = 1. 
key. Note that the video quality is the worst when the ECP parameters are 
Ei = 1 and Ep = 0.043, which corresponds to encrypting 4.3% of the data 
for every video packet. Note that when we select Ei = 10, Ep = 0.043, and 
Eb = 1 (this corresponds to Figure 6.1(e)), the visual quality of the video is 
still unacceptable for viewing. This shows that we can achieve high encryp-
tion throughput (i.e., around 11.82 MBytes/s or about 63 concurrent MPEG-1 
streams from Table 6.1) and, at the same time, ensure that those clients which 
do not possess the decryption keys will get unacceptable video quality on view-
ing. Figure 6.2 shows the corresponding results for five consecutive Quicktime 
video frames. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the Quicktime results. 
Experiment 4 (Discarding encrypted data analysis): 
In this experiment, we consider the effect on the video quality when an au-
thorized party just try to discard all of the encrypted data before decoding an 
encrypted stream without having the proper decryption key. We consider two 
different ways to discard those encrypted data. The first one is to drop all of 
the encrypted data, and the second one is to fill all of the encrypted data with 
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9.51 8.70 8.60 
飞 = 5 l l . a y 9.45 10.10 
f E j = 10 I 12.82 10.54 11.10 
(a) MPEG-1 streams 
encryption throughput p (MB/sec) 
direct drop fillzero 
1 12.48= 13.08 ° 12.46 
2 12.77— 13.11 12.76 
1 = 5 12.98— 13.05 12.97 
10 13.09 13.07 13.09 
(b) QuickTime streams 
(direct: decode directly; drop: drop encrypted data; fillzero: fill encrypted data with zeros.) 
Table 6.5: Effect of discarding encrypted data on the peak signal-to-noise ratio 
SNRpeak when Eb = 1 and Ep = 0.043. 
zeros. 
Table 6.5 illustrates the peak signal-to-noise ratio SNRpeak for dropping 
encrypted data and filling encrypted data with zeros under four different ECP 
encryption schemes. Note that we get similar, or even lower values of SNRpeak 
when discarding encrypted data, compared to direct decoding of the encrypted 
streams. Figure 6.1(e-g) and 6.2(e-g) show the five video frames decoded in 
each streams respectively, they suggested that discarding encrypted data does 
not help in improving the visual quality. This experiment indicates that an 
unauthorized party cannot get a better decoding quality by means of discarding 
the encrypted video data. 
Experiment 5 (Signal-to-Noise Analysis for Audio Streaming Appli-
cation): 
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In this experiment, we consider the effect on the audio quality as we vary the 
parameters Ei, Ep and Eb. The audio clip used in this experiment is a MPEG-1 
layer 3 encoded audio file at bit rate 128 kb/s. We compute the signal-to-noise 
ratio {SNR) with the Matlab program using the following equation: 
original听  
^^=i(original{i) — cipher 
where original{V) denotes the z-th sample in the wave form decoded from 
the original audio stream, and cipher{i) denotes the i-th sample in the wave 
form decoded from the encrypted audio stream without the decryption key. 
In this experiment, n equals 44100, which means that samples from the first 
one second of the audio stream are used. Note that a lower value of SNR 
indicates that the encrypted audio stream is acoustically more distorted from 
the original audio stream, while an SNR value of infinity indicates that the 
measured samples are exactly identical to those in the original audio stream. 
Table 6.6 illustrates the signal-to-noise ratio SNR for different values of Ei 
and Ep, when Ei = 1. Again, we observe that one does not need to encrypt 
all the audio packets to sufficiently distort the audio signal. In general, our 
proposed ECP method allows one to simultaneously achieve high encryption 
throughput and low audio fidelity during unauthorized access. 
signal-to-noise ratio SNR  
II Ep = 0.214 II Ep = 0.171 Ep = 0.120 || Ep = 0.086 || Ep = 0.043 
Ej = 1 — 0.9104 “ 0.7720 “ 0.8571 1  0.8429 1  0 .8264~  
'Ei = 2 — 0.5831 - 0.5608 _ 0.5614 — 0.5585 一 0.5707 
Ei = 5 0.5479 “ 1.0334 “ 1.0360 — 13.6172 2.3095 
Ei = 10 1.0494 1.0494 1.0494 || 25.1848 || 25.1849 
Table 6.6: Effect of EP and EI on the signal-to-noise ratio SNR on MPS audio 
when Eb = 1. 
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(a) Original frames 
b ^ B H ^ H B ^ h ^ E H B ^ H 
(b) Encrypted frames with Ei 二 IQ, Ep = 0.043 and E^ = 1. 
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(c) Encrypted frames with Ei 二 Ep = 0.043 and Eb = 1. 
國國國國國 
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(d) Encrypted frames with Ei = 2, Ep = 0.043 and Eb = 1. 
(e) Encrypted frames with Ei = 1, Ep = 0.043 and Et = 1. 
•國國隨翻 
(f) Encrypted frames with Ei = Ep = 0.043 and Eb = 1. (encrypted data are filled with zeros.) 
i g m m g i i m i g m i g g i 
(g) Encrypted frames with Ei = 1, Ep = 0.043 and Eb = 1. (encrypted data are being dropped.) 
Figure 6.1: Quality of five consecutive MPEG-1 video frames under different 
ECP parameters. 
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(a) Original frames 
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(b) Encrypted frames with Ei = 10, Ep = 0.043 and Eb = 1. 
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(c) Encrypted frames with Ei = b, Ep = 0.043 and Eb = 1. 
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(d) Encrypted frames with Ei = 2, Ep = 0.043 and Eb = 1. 
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(e) Encrypted frames with Ei = 1^  Ep = 0.043 and E^ = 1. 
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(f) Encrypted frames with Ei = 1, Ep = 0.043 and £ ' 5 = 1 . (encrypted data are filled with zeros.) 
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(g) Encrypted frames with Ei = 1, Ep = 0.043 and Et,= l- (encrypted data are being dropped.) 




Recent research on video proxies has mainly focused on caching strategies and 
replacement algorithms. Sen and Towsley [8] present how prefix caching at a 
proxy can help to shield clients from large start-up delay, low throughput, and 
high packet loss. Guo et al. [3] propose the use of a prefix-caching proxy in 
conjunction with a periodic broadcasting technique to improve system scala-
bility. Focusing on implementation and protocol issues, Cruber et al. [2] show 
how to realize proxy prefix caching by using the Real-Time Streaming Protocol 
(RTSP). Rejaie et al. [6] present a fine-grained replacement algorithm for a 
multimedia proxy, which targets layered-encoded streams. Kangasharju et al. 
4] present a caching model of layered-encoded multimedia streams, and pro-
pose utility heuristics whose performance are evaluated through their caching 
model. 
There are only a small number of papers emphasizing security issues in a 
video proxy. Griwodz et al. [1] propose an approach in which the proxy stores 
the major part of the video streams which are intentionally corrupted. The 
proxy can distribute the corrupted part via multicast transmission, while the 
origin server will supply the part for data reconstruction in a unicast manner. 
Since the original server must perform data encryption for each client, this is 
not a scalable solution. Tosun and Feng [10] propose a much more scalable 
approach based on a lightweight encryption algorithm for multimedia streams. 
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When a client makes a request, the proxy will decrypt the locally stored en-
crypted data and encrypt it again using the client's encryption key. The major 
drawback with their approach is that the use of light-weight encryption offers 
no proven resilience against attacks on data confidentiality. Furthermore, the 
need for decryption operations at the proxy results in higher computational 
overhead. Shi and Bhargava [9] present an MPEG video encryption algorithm 
called VEA such that one can encrypt a video stream multiple times (each 
with, say, a client-specific key) and still decrypt the video in a single opera-
tion using a composite decryption key. However, VEA is not resilient against 
plaintext attack. Hence, while the approach is highly efficient, more deter-
mined adversaries can obtain the VEA secret key with feasible efforts. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
We have presented the design and implementation of a multi-key secure multi-
media proxy architecture. Our design is based on the notion of an asymmetric 
reversible parametric sequence (ARPS). We discussed how ARPS can be ap-
plied to a general client-proxy-server architecture. To practically achieve the 
confidentiality properties of ARPS, we presented a multi-key RSA technique, 
and proved that the technique realizes an ARPS. In summary, our theoret-
ical results show that the proposed architecture can achieve comprehensive 
data confidentiality that is provably resilient against attacks, given standard 
computability assumptions. We have an implementation of our multimedia 
streaming architecture - consisting of server, proxy and client — on commodity 
Pentium III/800 MHz machines running Linux. Our implementation results 
empirically demonstrate how a set of four ECP parameters can trade off en-
cryption throughput against amount of data to protect, for a number of stan-
dard MPEG-1 and Quicktime video sequences, and a number of MP3 audio 
sequences. Our results indicate that it is possible to simultaneously achieve 
high encryption throughput and extremely low audio/video quality (in terms 
of decoded audio SNR and both PSNR and the visual quality of decoded 
video frames) during unauthorized access. For example, by using Ei = 10 
and Ep = 0.043, a single Pentium III/800 MHz machine can concurrently 
42 
Appendix Conclusion 43 
sustain more than 64 distinct MPEG-1 video streams, while giving good pro-
tection for the original video data. We also presented our Secure Multimedia 
Library (SML) that provides a comprehensive API for building secure multi-
media streaming applications based on the asymmetric parametric sequence. 
We believe that the proposed system offers an effective approach for delivering 
multimedia contents in a secure manner. 
Appendix A 
Function Prototypes of Secure 
Multimedia Library (SML) 
A.l CONNECTION AND AUTHENTICATION 
A.1.1 Create SML Session 
SML uses a SML_SESSION to identify each unique connection. For example, 
when a proxy is serving two concurrent end clients while accessing the source 
server, there will be three active SML_SESSION's in the proxy where each 
SML-SESSION has its own underlying transport layer sockets, encryption pa-
rameters, and connection states. To create a new SML_SESSION, a proxy 
needs to declare and call the initialization function: 
SML.SESSION session; 
SML_InitSession(SML_SESSION* session)； 
A.1.2 Public Key Manipulation 
SML uses public key cryptography to perform client authentication and session 
key encryption. SML has functions for key generation, key saving, and key 
retrieval. These function calls enable the creation of new key pair with a 
certain bit length, the storing of a key pair in a file with password protection, 
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and the loading of a key pair from the file. Currently, SML only supports the 
RSA method (however, hooks are provided to extend it to other methods). 
One can use the constant CRYPTO-KEYJISA to specify the key type to be 
RSA. The key creation and key saving/loading functions are: 
SML_CreateKeyPair(SML_SESSION* session, 
int bit—length, int public—exponent, int key—type); 
SML_SaveKeyPair(SML_SESSION* session, 
char* key_filename, char* password)； 
SML_LoadKeyPair(SML_SESSION* session, 
char* key.filename, char* password, int key_type)； 
There are also helper functions that enable key manipulation without an 
SML-SESSION. In fact, the above functions invoke the following lower level 
functions for doing the real work. To use these lower level functions, one needs 




int bit—length, int public_enponent, int key—type); 
CRYPTO.SaveKeyPair(CRYPTO_KEY_PAIR pair, 
char* key.filename, char* password)； 
CRYPTO.LoadKeyPair(CRYPTO_KEY_PAIR* pair， 
char* key.filename, char* password, int key_type)； 
A.1.3 Authentication 
SML has an authentication protocol integrated into its connect and accept 
functions, which gives the server the ability to verity the identity of a requesting 
client. The authentication is based on the correctness of the client's public 
key signature and the identification of the client's public key compared to that 
saved by the server. The server keeps a list of the public keys of all its approved 
clients, and the public key list file must be specified in the accept function call 
which will be described in the next section. SML provides helper functions for 
manipulating the public key list file, includomg adding an entry to, removing 
I 
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an entry from, and searching for an entry in the list file. Each entry in the 
list file consists of a user name and the user's public key in plaintext. These 
helper functions are: 
CRYPTO.AddKeyToListFile(CRYPTO.KEY key, 





BOOL CRYPTO_QueryUserFromListFile(char* user.naitie, 
int user_name_buf_size, CRYPTO_KEY key, char* key—list—filename); 
The first function will create a new file if the file specified by the filename 
does not exist. The second function and third function allow to delete an 
entry either by specifying the user name or the user's public key. The last 
function will search for the specified user's public key in the list file. It returns 
TRUE and the corresponding user name if the user exists, and returns FALSE 
otherwise. 
A.1.4 Connect and Accept 
A client connects to a server by calling the connect function with the server 
host address and the server's listening port. A server waits on a port for in-
coming clients by calling the accept function. The accept function blocks until 
a connection is established or when an error occurs. Notice that the accept 
function, on success, returns a pointer to a new SML.SESSION which corre-
sponds to the newly established connection, while the original SML.SESSION 
can be used to wait for other incoming client requests. 
SML.SESSION* SML.Accept(SML_SESSION* session, 
int port_to_listen, char* key_list.filename)； 
BOOL SML.Connect(SML.SESSION* session, 
char* server_host_name, int server_listening_port)； 
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A.1.5 Close Connection 
Once an SML.SESSION is finished or when one wishes to shut down a connec-
tion immediately, the destroy function can be called to release any allocated 
resources and close the underlying transport layer socket. 
SML.DestroySession(SML.SESSION* session)； 
A.2 SECURE DATA TRANSMISSION 
A.2.1 Asymmetric Reversible Parametric Sequence and 
Encryption Configuration Parameters 
SML uses the Asymmetric Reversible Parametric Sequence 
(ARPS) for the encryption and decryption of bulk data. To reduce complexity, 
SML uses encryption configuration parameters (ECP) to control the extent of 
encryption and decryption on the bulk data. ECP values and ARPS parame-
ters can be configured at the server side. The client side must then receive and 
use the server-selected setting in order to perform proper decryption. These 
related functions are: 
SML_InitRpsSetting(SML.SESSION* session, 
int EI, int EP, int EB, int pkt.size, 
RPS.ALGORITHM, int rps.key bit.length)； 
SML_SendRpsSetting(SML_SESSION* session)； 
SML_ReceiveRpsSetting(SML_SESSION* session)； 
The first function is used by a server to configure the ECP setting and gen-
erate a pair of ARPS encryption and decryption keys for the given SML_SESSION. 
The second to last parameter specifies the ARPS algorithm to be used. It must 
be MULTIJ<EY_RSA for the current version. The last parameter specifies the 
bit length of the ARPS keys to be generated. In order for the client to achieve 
proper data decryption, the client must have the same ECP setting and the 
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corresponding ARPS decryption key. One can use the second and third func-
tions to send the ECP setting and decryption key to the client. All the secret 
information sent will be encrypted using the client's public key. 
A.2.2 Bulk Data Encryption and Decryption 
SML integrates data encryption and decryption with network socket functions. 
Thus, only a single function call is required to encrypt data and send the data 
though the network, or to receive data from the network and decrypt the data. 
SML provides both TCP and UDP versions of the functions. Notice, how-
ever, that SML will neither handle packet loss nor out-of-order packets when 
the UDP functions are used. The reason why we do not provide packet loss 
recovery and in-order packet delivery is that different multimedia streaming 
applications may have different delivery requirements. Therefore, we allow 
users to adapt SML use to their own application needs. To encrypt or decrypt 
data using the configured ECP setting and APRS keys, one simply allocates 
the required memory buffers and calls the following functions: 
SML_TcpSendEncryptRps(SML_SESSION* session, 
char* send_buffer, int buffer_size)； 
SML_UdpSendEncryptRps(SML_SESSION* session, 
char* send_buffer, int buffer_size)； 
SML.TcpReceiveDecryptRps(SML.SESSIOM* session， 
char* receive.buffer, int buffer.size)； 
SML.UdpReceiveDecryptRps(SML.SESSION* session， 
char* receive_buffer, int buffer—size)； 
Note that packets of size smaller than or equal to the packet size specified in 
the function SML_InitRps() can be used. (However, packets of larger size are 
not allowed.) SML will automatically perform packet padding when necessary. 
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A.2.3 Entire Data Encryption and Decryption 
For certain information other than entertainment audio/video, full data en-
cryption may be preferred for security reasons. SML also provides function 
calls to encrypt and decrypt all data, without using ECP. Both TCP and 
UDP are supported. Since total data encryption or decryption does not de-
pend on the ECP setting, the packet size will not be limited by that specified 
in the function SML_InitRps() in this case. The related functions are: 
SML.TcpSendEncrypt(SML.SESSION* session, 
char* send_buffer, int buffer_size)； 
SML.UdpSendEncrypt(SML.SESSION* session, 
char* send_buffer, int buffer_size)； 
SML.TcpReceiveDecrypt(SML.SESSION* session, 
char* receive_buffer, int buffer_size)； 
SML.UdpReceiveDecrypt(SML.SESSION* session, 
char* buffer, int buffer_size)； 
A.3 Secure Proxy Architecture 
A.3.1 Proxy-Server Connection 
As described previously, a server needs to identify public keys from approved 
clients - these keys will be used to encrypt the decryption key required by 
a client, which should be kept secret even from the proxy. Therefore, the 
proxy should forward the client's public key (received from the client side 
SML_SESSION) to the server (sent through the server side SML.SESSION 
before calling the connect function). These related functions are: 
SML.GetClientPublicKey(SML.SESSION *session, CRYPTO_KEY *key)； 
SML.SetClientPublicKey(SML.SESSION *session, CRYPTO_KEY key)； 
A.3.2 ARPS and ECP 
SML performs ARPS cryptography. In order for the cryptography to work 
correctly, both ECP and the ARPS parameters must be preserved during a 
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chain of encryption, re-encryption and decryption. For example, the first time 
a proxy requests a particular multimedia object from a server, the server can 
select its own ECP setting and randomly generate the ARPS parameters for 
the SML_SESSION. However, when another client requests that cached object 
from the proxy, the proxy must request from the server a new re-encryption 
and decryption key pair based on the previously chosen ARPS parameters, 
and the proxy must use the previously chosen ECP setting. 
The server can use the following functions to store and retrieve HPS set-
tings. However, it is not necessary to deal with re-encryption key generation 
since both the functions 
SMLJnitRpsSettingO and SML_LoadRpsSetting() will internally generate a 
random re-encryption key pair, and the decryption keys will be encrypted 
using the authorized client's public key. 
SML_SaveRpsSetting(SML_SESSION* session, char* filename); 
SML_LoadRpsSetting(SML_SESSION* session， char* filename); 
Similar to the public key issue, a multimedia proxy is required to retrieve 
the ARPS setting from the server side's SML_SESSION and then use the same 
setting in the client side's SML_SESSION. One can use the following get and 
set functions to achieve this requirement. 
SML_GetRpsSetting(SML_SESSION *session, RPS.SETTING *rps)； 
SML_SetRpsSetting(SML_SESSION *session, RPS.SETTING rps)； 
A.3.3 Initial Sever Encryption 
If a client requests a multimedia object which is not cached by the proxy, the 
proxy needs to request the object from the server. The server simply encrypts 
the data packets using the functions described in Session A.2.2 as in the client-
server scenario. However, instead of decrypting the data packets, the proxy 
caches them without any decryption and modification. Note that the proxy 
does not have the capability to decrypt the data packets since the decryption 
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key is encrypted using the client's public key. The following SML functions 
will receive the data packets without performing any decryption operations. 
int SML.TcpReceiveRps(SML.SESSION* session, 
char* packet.buffer, int buffer_size)； 
int SML.UdpReceiveRps(SML.SESSION* session, 
char* packet.buffer, int buffer_size)； 
Since the size of data packets may change after ARPS encryption, the above 
two functions will return the actual size of the data received. And since the 
packet size may increase after encryption, one may need to allocate a buffer of 
a size larger than the plaintext data packet size. The following function allows 
to determinate the maximum packet size required: 
int SML_GetMaxRpsPacketSize(SML_SESSION* session)； 
A.3.4 Proxy Re-Encryption 
A proxy will receive the APRS re-encryption key along with other settings 
during the SML_ReceiveRpsSetting() function call. The proxy can use the 
following functions to re-encrypt those cached data packets. 
SML_TcpSendReEncryptRps(SML_SESSION* session, 
char* packet.buffer, int packet.size)； 
SML.UdpSendReEncryptRps(SML.SESSION* session， 
char* packet_biiffer, int packet_size)； 
A.3.5 Client Decryption 
A client will receive the ARPS decryption key along with other settings during 
the SML_ReceiveRpsSetting() function call. The client can simply use the 
same decryption functions described in Session A.2.2 to retrieve the plaintext 
data packets. 
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